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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this conceptual paper is to analyze 
the say-on-pay policies and practices in 5 different 
countries: UK, USA, Switzerland, Germany and 
Australia. The focus of the research is on the 
disclosure of the executive-to-worker pay ratio. The 
author discusses about the relevance and effects of 
such practice on firm performance and employee 
motivation, loyalty and productivity, as well as on 
the investors’ decisions. This article addresses those 
issues through a comparative approach, by selecting 
pay ratio-relevant theoretical and empirical studies. 
The results indicate that the disclosure of pay ratio 
improves the firm’s and individuals’ performance and 
therefore it should be introduced as an obligatory 




- executive-to-worker pay ratio
- remuneration disclosure regulations
- pay ratio’ disclosure effects
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Lacmanović S.  2013. The relevance and effects of the 
Executive to worker ay ratio disclosure, Ekonomska istraživanja – Economic Research Special Issue 2013
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I. INTRODUCTION        
The global financial crisis has fostered the introduction of say-on-pay policies in many different 
legal environments but also accelerated their implementation in companies’ reporting practices. 
Because of the executives’ self-oriented misbehavior which has led to many short-term oriented 
high-risk decisions the debate about disclosing their pays and the compensation policies is in the 
focus of law and economics’ specialist over the last few years. The pressure of public expectations 
toward executives’ accountability has paved the road to new regulatory provisions. 
The purpose of this conceptual paper is to analyze the say-on-pay policies and practices in 5 
different countries: UK, USA, Switzerland, Germany and Australia, with the focus on the executive-
to-worker pay ratio’ disclosure. The relevance of the disclosure is analyzed through its effects on 
the companies’ performance and on the motivation, loyalty and productivity of their employees, 
as well as on the investors’ decisions.
The paper is divided in seven chapters. After a brief introduction an insight in the say-on-pay’ 
legal framework in chosen 5 countries is given in chapter II. Chapter III shows the history and trends 
of the executive-to-worker pay ratio. The author presents the available comparative data of the 
executive-to-worker pay ratios in different countries which are commented within the historical 
background and within different economic and cultural environments in which they were created1. 
Chapter IV deals with the effects of the pay ratio’ disclosure and is a theoretical framework for 
chapter V in which the methodology, results and findings of the research are presented. In chapter 
VI the conclusions and implications are summarized, and the list of references can be found in 
chapter VII.
The author addresses the research questions through a comparative approach, by selecting 
pay ratio-relevant theoretical and empirical studies (a desk research method was used). The 
availability of data for the Republic of Croatia has limited the scope of the research. However, the 
author comments the presumed ratios in the Croatian companies and makes a comparison to the 
situation in the period of socialism. The lack of comparable empirical data for chosen 5 countries 
has directed the research to the combination of selected pay ratio-relevant theoretical and 
empirical studies and variables. The results of comparative research and interpretive analysis show 
that the disclosure of pay ratio improves the firm’s and individuals’ performance and therefore it 
should be introduced as an obligatory part of the yearly remuneration report. 
II. THE SAY-ON-PAY’ LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The comparative analysis of chosen 5 countries begins with the comparison of the legal framework 
for executive-to-worker pay ratio’ disclosure2. The 5 countries were chosen because of the changes 
in company laws which have enabled executive-to-worker pay ratio’ disclosure, i.e., because of 
the newly undertaken initiatives which call for disclosure. By the executive-to-worker pay ratio’ 
disclosure it is meant a requirement for companies to disclose the ratio of the annual compensation 
of its chief executive officer (CEO) to the median annual compensation of its employees.
The United Kingdom was the first country in which a mandatory, yet non-binding or 
1 Grennes, T.: The Impact of National Culture on CEO Compensation and Salary Gaps Between CEOs and Manufacturing 
Workers, Compensation and Benefits Review, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2011, p. 100-108.
2 Lieder, J., Fischer, Ph.: The Say-on-Pay Movement – Evidence From a Comparative Perspective, European Company 
and Financial Law Review,  No. 3, 2011, p. 376-421.
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advisory say-on-pay vote was introduced through the Companies Act in 2002. The debate now 
moved on to whether the vote should become binding, and if the data on executive-to-worker 
pay ratio should also be disclosed, i.e., included in the Remuneration Report. The Trades Union 
Congress, the UK national labor federation, declared in March 2013, that they will be voting the 
shares their pension funds hold in UK corporations against any corporate pay plans that top the 
20:1 ratio.3
In the USA the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 2010) 
has introduced a new say-on-pay provisions, which have been applied for the first time in the 
2011 proxy season. The rules on submission of pay ratios are included under Section 953 (b) and 
still waiting to be specified, but there are strong initiatives which are aimed at accelerating the 
implementation of these provisions4. Recently a petition campaign to the United States Congress 
was created to pass legislation to limit the pay ratio to 50:1.5 But, as expected, the corporate 
lobbyists are fighting against the implementation of pay ratio’ disclosure. Their arguments are 
biased on the costs of disclosure for companies and no real benefits for investors (both arguments 
are discussed in chapter V). In March 2013 representative Bill Huizenga has introduced the 
Burdensome Data Collection Relief Act in order to repeal the pay level’ and pay ratio’ disclosure 
requirements, i.e. to propose elimination of Dodd-Frank Pay Disclosure. The committee assigned 
to this bill (The House Financial Services Committee) sent it to the House or Senate as a whole for 
consideration on June 19, 2013. Although the chance of being enacted is low (prognosis is about 
20 %)6, it is interesting to see such a negative business reaction to the disclosure requirements. This 
is of course not truth for all American companies. Some of them are already reporting their pay 
ratios and it is the part of their compensation policy and philosophy (e.g. Whole Foods Market).
On the 3rd of March 2013 the Swiss voted by 68 per cent for the introduction of a binding 
say on executive pay and an annual right to vet board appointments. The so called «peoples’ 
initiative against fat-cat pay» is now to be written into the Swiss constitution and translated in 
the company law. The results of the Swiss referendum also initiated a debate about executive-to-
worker pay ratios (a ratio of 12:1 has been proposed7) and the need for its disclosure.
After Swiss referendum the say-on-pay initiatives gained force in other European countries 
such as Spain, Belgium, France, Portugal and Denmark, and the European Union is also to propose 
shareholder say on manager’s pay including the disclosure of executive-to-worker pay ratio by 
the end of the year 2013. The Commission will propose in 2013 an initiative, possibly through 
a modification of the shareholders’ rights Directive, to improve transparency on remuneration 
policies and individual remuneration of directors, as well as to grant shareholders the right to vote 
on remuneration policy and the remuneration report.8 It will be interesting to observe the effects 
3  A New Labor Goal for the CEO-Worker Pay Gap, March 30, 2013, available at http://inequality.org/labor-goal-ceoworker-
pay-gap/ (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
3 The AFL-CIO’s White Paper: Dodd-Frank Section 953 (b): Why CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratios Matter to Investors, available 
at: http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/1090/9807/version/1/file/Why-CEO-to-Worker-Pay-Ratios-Matter-For-
Investors.pdf (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
5 Congress: Cap CEO Pay at 50X Salary of the Average Worker, available at: http://www.credomobilize.com/petitions/
congress-cap-ceo-pay-at-50x-salary-of-the-average-worker (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
6 H.R. 1135: Burdensome Data Collection Relief Act, available at: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/
hr1135#overview (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
7 Executive Pay: Fixing the Fat Cats, March 9th, 2013, available at: http://www.economist.com/news/business/21573169-
switzerland-votes-curb-executive-pay-fixing-fat-cats (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
8 Communication from the Commission Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance - A Modern 
Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, COM (2012) 740 final, p. 9.
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of these changes on the companies in the Republic of Croatia, which has joined the European 
Union in July 2013.
The optional or mandatory say-on-pay provisions were earlier adopted in Netherlands (in 
2004), Sweden (in 2006) and Norway (in 2007). In Germany the optional and non-binding say on 
pay provisions were introduced through the Act on the Adequacy of Executive Compensation 
under German Stock Corporation Act in 2009. After the Swiss referendum there are now strong 
initiatives for the introduction of binding shareholder vote on directors pay and of the obligatory 
executive-to-worker pay ratio’ disclosure.
Australia has had a mandatory nonbinding shareholder vote on the remuneration report 
since 2005. However, in July 2011, with the Corporations Amendment Act 2011, a binding vote was 
introduced, the so-called “two-strikes” regime. Under this regime, if 25 % or more of shareholders 
vote against a company’s remuneration report at two consecutive annual general meetings, 
the board is subject to a so-called «spill» motion. If the spill motion receives the support of 
50 % or more of the company’s shareholders, then a separate general meeting must be called 
within 90 days at which all directors except for executive directors must stand for re-election. 
The company directors see only costs in the implementation of such a say-on-pay policy (a huge 
additional workload for boards, possibly distracting them from other value-adding activities; 
logistical challenges and financial costs for companies planning for a spill meeting; the risk that 
a small minority of shareholders holds a board to ransom by seeking changes often unrelated to 
remuneration; boards forced to improve their shareholder communications and engagement), 
but the fact is that the second reporting season since the introduction of the “two-strikes” rule 
left over 20 companies with two strikes and three recovering from spill meetings.9 And there are 
now new proposed changes to executive remuneration legislation. The proposed reforms in the 
Exposure Draft of the Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration Disclosures and Other 
Measures) Bill 2012 include: requiring listed companies to disclose in the remuneration report 
whether any overpaid remuneration has been “clawed back”, and if not, an explanation of why; 
requiring more transparent disclosure of termination payments or “golden handshake” payments; 
relieving certain unlisted entities from the obligation to prepare a remuneration report.10
All the above mentioned changes in the legal framework11 enabled the shareholder revolt 
against CEOs pay. However, this new right was not abused, as some business representatives were 
announcing. Among approximately 2,700 U.S. companies that put their executive compensation 
plans before shareholders for a vote in 2011, only 41 (or 1.5 percent) failed to receive majority 
approval. During 2012, results have been similar, with fewer than 2 percent of companies failing 
to receive majority approval.12   While only a small percentage of public companies received a 
shareholder vote of “no” in 2011 and 2012, negative recommendations by shareholder advisory 
firms can adversely affect how a company’s governance is perceived. And what is interesting is that 
9 New Executive Pay Worries, Company Director Magazine, April 2013, available at: http://www.companydirectors.com.au/
Director-Resource-Centre/Publications/Company-Director-magazine/2013-back-editions/April/Feature-New-executive-
pay-worries (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
10 Ibid.
11 For rewiev of executive pay reforms (passed/proposed) and of principles for economic fairness and stability (narrower 
CEO-worker pay gaps and others ...) see in: Anderson, S. et al.: CEO Pay and the Great Recession, Institute for Policy Studies, 
2010.
12 Larcker, D. F. et al., 2012: Ten Myths of «Say on Pay», Stanford Graduate Shool of Business, available at: http://www.
ieseinsight.com/doc.aspx?id=1378&ar=3 (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
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those cases where shareholders voted against the executive pay package “mostly have to do with 
a perceived disconnect between pay and performance.”13
Similar results are also for the UK companies. Using data on about 50,000 resolutions over 
the period 2002 to 2007 the researchers have found that less than 10% of shareholders abstain or 
vote against the mandated Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) resolution.  Also, investors are 
more likely to vote against DRR resolutions compared to non-pay resolutions. Third, shareholders 
are more likely to vote against general executive pay resolutions, such as stock options, long-term 
incentive plans and bonus resolutions compared to non-pay resolutions. Forth, firms with higher 
CEO pay attract greater voting dissent.14
III. THE HISTORY AND TRENDS OF THE EXECUTIVE-TO-WORKER PAY RATIO
The discussion about the relevance of the executive-to-worker pay ratio’ disclosure is focused 
on its implications for the companies’ success, but also on its impact on the country’s economy 
(theories of justice). This paper deals with the effects on the micro-level (equity theory).
The history of the executive-to-worker pay ratio shows that the gap between the executive’ 
and worker’s pay has significantly deepened, especially from the 1980’s. This is especially evident in 
the U.S. companies, where today’s pay ratio is 17.7 times greater than the pay ratio in the 1960’s.15 
The rise of the pay ratio in the U.S. companies from 1965 was as follows16:
- in 1965 - 20:1
- in 1982 - 42:1
- in 1992 - 201:1
- in 2002 - 281:1
- in 2012 - 354:1.
The Economic Policy Institute (USA) has calculated that the average CEO compensation 
increased between 1978 and 2011 by 725 %. In the same period the average worker’s compensation 
increased by only 5.7 % despite increases in productivity.17
According to the Boston-based United for a Fair Economy (UFE)18, from 1990 to 2003, 
CEO pay jumped 313 percent, while corporate profits climbed 128 percent. During the same 
13 Miller, S.: Executive Pay: How Much is Too Much?, Growing Pay Disparity Between Top Executives and Average Workers 
Threatens Morale, available at: http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/compensation/articles/pages/executive-pay-how-
much.aspx (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
14 Cavanagh, M. J., Sadler, G. V.: Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay 
in the U.K., Cornell University ILR School, Compensation Research Initative, August 2009, available at: http://
digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=cri (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
15 In determining the pay ratio the median annual employee compensation is used as an adequate measure of average 
worker pay.
16 The data presented here include the CEO’s pay of S&P 500 Index companies. The worker pay is the average non-
supervisory employee’s pay. CEO Pay and You, available at: http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/CEO-Pay-and-
You (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
17 Mishel, L., Sabadish, N.: CEO Pay and the Top 1 %: How Executive Compensation and Financial-Sector Pay Have 
Fueled Income Inequality, May 2, 2012, available at: http://www.epi.org/publication/ib331-ceo-pay-top-1-percent/ 
(accessed 29 Aug 2013).
18 Available at: http://faireconomy.org/ (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
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period, average worker pay rose 49 percent, just above inflation, which rose 41 percent. If the U.S. 
minimum wage had increased as quickly as CEO pay since 1990, according to UFE, it would today 
be $ 15.71 per hour, more than three times the current minimum wage of $ 5.15 an hour. While 
workers are increasingly anxious about their job security and how they will pay the rising costs of 
everything from health insurance to housing, from college to gasoline, says UFE’s Scott Klinger, 
corporate executives continue to distance themselves from the cares and worries of those they 
lead. It sends a poor message to demand cost cutting from the factory floor, while costs in the 
executive suits are left to soar.19
There are of course significant differences in pay ratio between countries and between 
companies in the same country, but the trend is similar. In the analysis of causes of the current 
financial crisis greed has certainly earned its place. The central question is what was the motivation 
for such high salaries and how were they approved? The short term orientation which dominated 
in many companies before the financial crisis could be one of the key reasons for compensation 
models that were linked to the realization of the company’s short term goals. 
The 20th anniversary Executive Excess report examines the performance of the 241 
corporate chief executives who have ranked among America’s 25 highest-paid CEOs in one or 
more of the past 20 years. The report’s key finding is that nearly 40 percent of the CEOs on these 
highest-paid lists were eventually “bailed out, booted, or busted.” The bailed out CEOs whose 
firms either ceased to exist or received taxpayer bailouts after the 2008 financial crash held 22 
percent of the slots in the sample. Richard Fuld of Lehman Brothers enjoyed one of Corporate 
America’s largest 25 paychecks for eight consecutive years — until his firm went belly up in 2008. 
Not counting those on the bailed out list, another 8 percent of the sample was made up of CEOs 
who wound up losing their jobs involuntarily. Despite their poor performance, the “booted” 
CEOs jumped out the escape hatch with golden parachutes valued at $48 million on average. 
The busted CEOs who led corporations that ended up paying significant fraud-related fines or 
settlements comprised an additional 8 percent of the sample. One CEO had to pay a penalty out 
of his own pocket for stock option back-dating. The other companies shelled out payments that 
totaled over $100 million per firm.20
In the table 1 a comparative set of pay ratios’ data is given for the chosen countries around 
the world. The differences in pay ratios are evident and could be explained through different 
economic environments and cultural values in which they were developed, but also through the 
recent changes in the legal framework (e.g. UK). As expected, in countries which praise individual 
success (e.g. USA) the pay gap is much bigger then in countries whose values are more connected 
to the collective (e.g. Japan), i. e., in countries with developed well-being state (e.g. Sweden). 
19 Gaping Pay Gap Grows, Multinational Monitor, April 2004, Vol. 25, No. 4.
20 Anderson, S. et al.: Executive Excess 2013: Bailed Out, Booted and Busted, A 20-year Review of America’s Top Paid CEOs, 
Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, 2013, available at: http://www.ips-dc.org/reports/executive-excess-2013 (accessed 
29 Aug 2013).
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TABLE 1 - CEO-TO-WORKER PAY RATIOS AROUND THE WORLD


















Source: CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratios around the World, available at: http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/CEO-Pay-and-
You/CEO-to-Worker-Pay-Gap-in-the-United-States/Pay-Gaps-in-the-World (accessed 29 Aug 2013)
The data in the table 1 represent an average pay ratio in the given country (the data are for 
2011 and 2012). By further analysis of any specific country great differences in pay ratio between 
different companies could be detected. They are result of the different organization philosophy 
and compensation policy from company to company. As an example a list of highest and lowest 
pay ratios in the USA is given in the table 2 (the data are for 2012). For comparison purposes the 
employee satisfaction data (as percentage of high job satisfaction) are given next to the pay ratio.21 
Many companies, as Whole Foods Market for example, clearly stated that “their compensation 
philosophy emphasizes internal pay equity and fair treatment of all stakeholders”.22
21 The employee satisfaction data should be taken with caution, because as the theory and practice is proving, there are 
numbers of different variables whose influence on job satisfaction is significant. CEO Pay in Perspective, available at: http://
www.payscale.com/data-packages/ceo-income/fortune-100 (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
22 Whole Foods Market is in organic food business. The company’s pay ratio in 2012 was 19:1. CEO-to-Worker Pay Gap 
in the United States, available at: http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/CEO-Pay-and-You/CEO-to-Worker-Pay-Gap-in-
the-United-States (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
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TABLE 2 - FIVE HIGHEST AND FIVE LOWEST PAY RATIOS IN THE U.S. FORTUNE’S TOP 
COMPANIES
Company
CEO pay to 
median employee 
pay ratio
% High job satisfaction
Wal-Mart Stores 1034:1 53 %
Target 597:1 59 %
Walt Disney 557:1 73 %
Honeywell 440:1 71 %
McDonald’s 435:1 56 %
…
Amazon.com 18:1 71 %
Sunoco 15:1 88 %
Microsoft 12:1 69 %
Berkshire Hathaway 9:1 63 %
Google 0:123 83 %
Source: CEO Pay in Perspective, available at: http://www.payscale.com/data-packages/ceo-income/fortune-100 (accessed 
29 Aug 2013).
The pay ratio in Croatian publicly listed companies is estimated as 7:1 - 10:1.24 There are still 
no available empirical data which could confirm or deny the estimation made in 2005 (there is a 
great need for empirical research of this topic). However, what can be traced from the statements 
given to the local media are the existent differences in pay ratio between companies.25 During the 
period of socialism the pay ratio between director’s wage and minimum wage was set from 5:1 
to 9:1 in statutes of many companies. It is interesting to observe that the compensation policy 
which was then oriented to fair pay for all employees has set the ratio not to the average worker 
pay but to the minimum wage. The Republic of Croatia has joined the EU in July 2013 and it will 
be interesting to follow the reflection of changes in the European legal environment regarding pay 
ratio’ disclosure on the Croatian companies.
The question about the need for pay ratio’ disclosure is followed by the question of its 
effects on the employees’ morale, productivity and motivation. Next to that the relevance of pay 
ratio’ disclosure for investors and company performance should be analyzed. Those and other 
effects are discussed in the chapter IV.
23 The pay ratio is calculated by dividing CEO annual cash compensation with median annual employee pay. The annual 
cash compensation of Larry Page in 2012 was 1 $.
24 Račić, D., Cvijanović, V.: Kvaliteta korporativnog upravljanja u javnim dioničkim društvima, Ekonomski institut, Zagreb, 
2005.
25 For example see in: Daskalović, Z.: Hrvatski menadžeri plaćeniji od slovenskih, April 2008, available at: http://www.
poslovni.hr/after5/hrvatski-menadzeri-placeniji-od-slovenskih-76774#, or  Radusinović D.: Tko su najbolje plaćeni 
menadžeri u Hrvatskoj: Zarađuju i do 16 prosječnih plaća mjesečno!, May 2011, available at: http://www.jutarnji.hr/tko-su-
najbolje-placeni-menadzeri-u-hrvatskoj/946201/ (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE PAY RATIO’ DISCLOSURE - A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The effects of the pay ratio’ disclosure are most often analyzed through its impact on the 
individuals’ performance (supervisory and non-supervisory employees) and on the companies’ 
performance.
The arguments for/against pay ratio’ disclosure are based on theoretical and empirical 
research. The researchers can be classified in two groups: one group is focused on the influence 
of pay ratio’ disclosure on employee’s motivation, morale, behavior, loyalty and productivity. i.e. 
performance, as well as on the executive compensation level; the other group is focused on the 
effects of the pay ratio’ disclosure on the companies’ financial results, total effectiveness, image in 
public and similar. Both are arguing the arguments for high/low pay ratios.
Critics of the disclosure and advocates of high pay ratios are saying that managers of today 
are working in a very complex, unstable and global environment and therefore CEOs earn high 
salaries when they successfully manage the companies in such turbulent circumstances. The 
problem with these arguments is connected with the definition of the term success, i. e. successfully: 
how do we measure success (realization of short-term or long-term goals?; profit at any costs or 
profit with taking in consideration the broad area of interests of different stakeholders?) and who 
is responsible (creator) of success - only supervisors or all employees and other stakeholders? If 
we consider company success as a result of a team work, then we have many who deserve a fair 
compensation for their contribution to the creation of value/wealth. “Astronomical CEO pay is 
based on the false idea that the success of a corporation is due to one CEO genius. In reality, all 
employees create value, and CEO pay levels should be more in line with the rest of their company’s 
employee pay structure. CEOs should be paid as a member of a team, not as a superstar,” said AFL-
CIO President Richard Trumka.26
If we, on the other side, focus on the individual’s performance then is the key question: 
does CEO’s high pays motivate other employees to work harder to get promotion (and which is 
the percentage of employees who have the potential and thrive to get promoted) or is such a big 
pay gap a negative factor for employees morale, motivation and productivity (which is the case 
when employee perceive their compensation as unfair comparing to that of their supervisors). 
Some of the researchers found that after a certain point larger pay differences can create feelings 
of injustice that can diminish cooperation, quality and commitment to long-term success.27
In discussing the role of disclosure one thing should be stressed: it is not the disclosure by 
itself that improves the companies’ performance (through effective shareholder oversight), but 
how detailed the disclosure is. If it doesn’t include detailed information about the compensation 
structure and policy, it contributes much lower. In particular, aggregate disclosure concerning 
total firm executive pay which does not explain remuneration policy and the often highly complex 
performance conditions applicable or set out the specific components of the pay packages of 
particular and named senior executives will not allow shareholders to assess pay policy effectively. 
28
26 Garofalo, P.: Average Fortune 500 CEO Now Paid 380 Times As Much As The Average Worker, April 2012, available at: 
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/04/19/467516/ceo-pay-gap-2011/?mobile=nc (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
27 Bloom, M.: The Performance Effects of Pay Dispersion on Individuals and Organizations, Academy of Management 
Journal, 42, 1999, p. 25-50.
28 Ferrarini , G., Moloney, N.: Executive Remuneration in the EU: The Context for Reform, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
Vol. 21, No. 2, (2005), p. 311. 
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The focus of this paper is on the effects of pay ratio’ disclosure, by considering the possible influence 
of disclosure on lowering the executive-to-worker pay ratio. However, it should be said that the 
disclosure is not the only variable that affects pay ratio. Some other variables, as empirical data 
are showing, are also significant. High performance human resource practices are, for example, 
associated with lower manager-to-worker pay differentials.29
With respect to the materiality of the information, ratios have particular importance in 
the era of “say on pay.”   An advisory vote on compensation gives shareholders an opportunity 
to comment on the reasonableness of CEO pay.   Reasonableness, however, requires context.   
Metrics that allow for a comparison of pay practices among public companies can assist in 
providing the requisite context. Moreover, the ratios provide a mechanism for assessing the 
reasonableness of the compensation within each particular company. Variations in the ratio 
that arise from differences in business models or geographic reach can be addressed through 
accompanying  disclosure.  Companies can explain the relevant differences through the use of 
narrative and additional ratios. Moreover, such information will likely have the benefit of providing 
shareholders with additional insight into the calculation of CEO compensation and the company’s 
employment practices. The most significant impact of the ratio may, however, be on the board 
of directors.  The disclosure requirement effectively increases the information available to boards 
when setting executive pay.   Some boards already take ratios into account when determining 
compensation. Because a bad ratio may be embarrassing, the board has an incentive to alter 
compensation in order to avoid adverse disclosure. Disclosure of the ratio may, therefore, impact 
the amount of compensation paid to employees and the CEO.30
One consequence of increasing disparities between executive compensation and average 
worker pay is lower morale, said Eleanor Bloxham, founder and CEO of the Value Alliance, a board 
and senior executive advisory firm. At the largest U.S. firms, “People feel disconnected from the 
CEO. They are not willing to share with management what could be fixed or improved. The people 
on the ground don’t feel that top management understands them,” she said. Big pay disparities 
also impact the effectiveness of the CEOs themselves, because “they become disconnected, not 
understanding what their employees have to deal with or what their customers are going through. 
They’re in a protective bubble,” she noted. Bloxham was critical of the use of both stock options 
and restricted stock shares as a large portion of executive compensation packages. Rather than 
tying pay more closely to executive performance, as they are intended to do, she argued, “You have 
managers cutting costs to increases the stock price because their pay is tied to stock. And then 
they cut costs some more. That’s what we’re experiencing now.”31 
The Institute for Policy Studies in their comments to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission lay out three reasons why extreme pay differentials tend to undermine enterprise 
effectiveness32:
•	 they lead to lower morale and higher turnover rates that undermine productivity 
29 Colvin A. J. S. et al.: How High Performance Human Resource Practices and Workforce Unionization Affect Managerial 
Pay, Personnel Psychology, 54 (2001), p. 903-934.
30 Brown, Jr., J. R.: Dodd-Frank, Compensation Ratios, and the Expanding Role of Shareholders in the Governance Process, 2 
Harvard Business Law Review Online 91 (2011), available at: http://www.hblr.org/?p=1751 (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
31 Miller, S.: Executive Pay: How Much is Too Much?, Growing Pay Disparity Between Top Executives and Average Workers 
Threatens Morale, available at: http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/compensation/articles/pages/executive-pay-how-
much.aspx (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
32 The pay ratio is calculated by dividing CEO annual cash compensation with median annual employee pay. The annual 
cash compensation of Larry Page in 2012 was 1 $.
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John Mackey, CEO of Whole Foods, limits his cash compensation to no more than 19 times 
the average for workers at his firm. “Because of the yawning gap between the leaders and the 
led, employee morale is suffering, talented performers’ loyalty is evaporating, and strategy and 
execution is suffering at American companies,” Mackey wrote for the Harvard Business Review. 
“Employees really do care about this issue, and a smaller gap makes for greater solidarity, and 
as a result better performance, throughout the workplace.”   A Notre Dame report found that 
senior executives at companies with wide management pay gaps are twice as likely to exit as senior 
executives at companies where pay was more equally distributed.
•	 they reinforce rigid corporate hierarchies that discourage workers from being creative 
contributors to enterprise success 
Peter Drucker, the father of modern management theory, pointed out in the early 1980s 
that in any hierarchy, every level of bureaucracy must be compensated at a higher rate than the 
level below. The more levels, the higher the pay at the top. This gives CEOs a personal interest 
in maintaining rigid hierarchies that are disempowering for workers. During the 1970s, Peter 
Drucker recommended that 20 times average worker pay was an appropriate upside ceiling for 
top executive compensation. A landmark Brookings Institution report by David Levine supported 
this general view, stating “large differences in status can inhibit participation.”
•	 they reinforce a “celebrity CEO” culture that is not conducive to high executive per-
formance
Jim Collins, a former scholar at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, spent five years 
trying to determine “what it takes” to turn an average company into a “great” one. He eventually 
identified 11 firms that had successfully generated off-the-charts stock returns over 15 years. Not a 
single one had a high-paid CEO.  A celebrity CEO, Collins wrote, turns a company into “one genius 
with 1,000 helpers.” 
The Institute concludes in their comments about Dodd-Frank Act that American’s long-
term economic health will depend, in large part, on the productivity of their enterprises. The new 
CEO-worker pay ratio requirement, if allowed to go into force, could significantly enhance that 
productivity — and, as a result, U. S. competitive capacity.33
The analysis of pay ratio’ disclosure effects should take into account the hidden costs 
of excessive executive compensation. If we take, for example, the turnover rates, some human 
experts “place the cost of a single turnover at between 100 and 300 percent of the employee’s 
annual wages or salary.”34 These are real financial facts that corporations should consider when 
making decisions about their compensation policy.
In the end, in order to help companies, the real question is: how to measure the fairness of 
executive pay? Some authors have tried to give the answer.35 Bowers and Whittlesey, for example, 
give following recommendations: focus on job size when scrutinizing pay levels, integrate external 
competitiveness into notions of fairness, consider pay mix and performance as a tool for assessing 
33 Anderson, S.: CEO-Worker Pay Ratio Rule Under Attack, May 2011, available at: http://csrwiretalkback.tumblr.com/
post/5371011123/ceo-worker-pay-ratio-rule-under-attack (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
34 Cavanagh, J., op. cit. note 32.
35 Venkatasubramanian, V.: What is Fair Pay For Executives?: An Information Theoretic Analysis of Wage Distributions, 
Entropy, 11, 2009.
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fairness, take a long-term view of long-term incentives and use ratios cautiously. As was discussed, 
when comparing ratios across organizations, one must consider organization size, organization 
structure, governance, business complexity, total compensation design and a host of other 
factors.36
It is worth noting that in May 2013 a new Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines were 
introduced (G4). The new guidelines include new disclosures on the ratio of executive compensation 
to median compensation, the ratio of executive compensation to lowest compensation and the 
ratio of executive compensation increase to median compensation.37
The NEF organization (New Economic Forum) has proposed the introduction of the 
Charter of Responsible Pay, which can be endorsed by investors and employers organizations, and 
will need to be drafted partly by them – because it will be pressure from investors that will force 
companies to sign up to the precepts of the charter. A situation should be encouraged whereby 
companies that do not sign up are asked difficult questions by investors about why they have not. 
The charter might include a maximum acceptable bottom-to-top pay, aware that there may be 
reasonable exceptions to this, but which can be explained by the companies and organizations 
themselves. It could also include: transparent executive pay processes, binding provisions for 
shareholders to have a ‘say on pay’ for CEOs and directors, non-inflationary pay (companies 
need to be responsible for the social and inflationary effects of their executive pay), employee 
representatives on the remuneration committee, bonuses linked to environmental, social and 
other risk factors, the possibility of pay claw back for failure to balance bonuses for success, no 
hiring bonuses or golden parachutes (if new CEOs are not committed to the future, they should 
not be hired), stock options must be available to all staff at the same price.38
V. RESULTS AND FINDINGS
This conceptual paper is intended to identify and understand the effects of the executive-to-
worker pay ratio disclosure. Therefore, the research questions for this paper were created as follows:
1. How the pay ratio’ disclosure affects firm performance, employee motivation, loyalty 
and productivity, and the investors’ decisions?
2. Does the pay ratio disclosure lead to lower pay ratio, i.e. fair compensation for all 
employees, and consequently enhance employee’s morale, individual and company’s 
performance, as well as attract investors?
The answers to the research questions were based on an extended review and interpretive 
analysis of literature. The research was based on comparison of the executive-to-worker pay ratio 
disclosure policies and practices in 5 chosen countries, by taking in consideration the regulatory 
differences, the corporate structure differences39 and ratio differences. Minimal biased methods 
were used in collecting literature for the paper. In order to minimize bias related to this research 
36 Bowers, J., Whittlesey, F.: Understanding Executive Pay Equity and Fairness: Ratios and Rationality, World at Work Journal, 
Third Quarter, 2010.
37 G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, Global Reporting Initiative, 2013, available at: https://www.globalreporting.org/
resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
38 Simms, A., Boyle, D.: The Ratio – Common Sense Controls for Executive Pay and Revitalising UK Business, NEF, July, 2011, 
available at: http://s.bsd.net/nefoundation/default/page/-/files/The_Ratio.pdf (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
39 He, L.: Do Founders Matter? A Study of Executive Compensation, Governance Structure and Firm Performance, Journal 
of Business Venturing, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2008, p. 257-279.
THE RELEVANCE AND EFFECTS OF THE EXECUTIVE-TO-WORKER PAY RATIO’ DISCLOSURE 177
THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
“THE CHANGING ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE: ISSUES, IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS”
a number of aspects to the topic was explored before writing the article. A number of databases 
in fields such as economics, psychology, sociology and law were used, and topics related to the 
pay ratio that consistently showed up in literature were included in the paper. In that way the 
author has not limited the research to the areas of his own interest. The author presents both the 
arguments for and against the disclosure of executive-to-worker pay ratio, i.e. the positive and the 
negative effects of disclosure. The results of the research, a review of pay ratio-relevant theoretical 
and empirical studies, have been presented in the table 3. Because of the lack of the data not only 
disclosure effects are given, but the different effects of pay ratio and CEO compensation level.
The results are grouped by focus of the research and by the category of effects. Due to the 
limited length of this paper only the key results are presented. This summary’s purpose was not 
to present all available researchers’ work but to give insight in some key aspects of their valuable 
results and conclusions. Because of the lack of comparable empirical data (for the chosen 5 
countries) the comparative analysis of pay ratio’ disclosure effects couldn’t have been possible 
and it will be the subject of author’s future research work. Many authors mentioned here have 
given their theoretical contribution to the analysis of disclosure effects, and the empirical data are 
most for UK and USA. What is evident in the here presented results is the lack of proof for strong 
link between pay ratio’ disclosure and company performance. Perhaps with a more sophisticated 
econometric model, e. g. structural equation modeling, an indirect link (lower employee’s morale 
brings to lower company performance) could be proved. With such a quantitative approach a 
more exact answer to the second research question could be possible.
TABLE 3 - THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, PAY RATIO AND ITS DISCLOSURE’ EFFECTS
Author Focus of the research Effects
Brick et. al., 2002 CEO compensation 
and firm performance
“excessive compensation are associated with firm underperformance; 




The growth of 
executive pay, 1993 - 
2003
“during this period, pay has grown much beyond the increase that 
could be explained by changes in firm size, performance, and industry 
classification; equity-based compensation has increased considerably 
but this growth has not been accompanied by a substitution effect - a 
reduction in non-equity compensation “
Eichholtz et al., 2008 The drivers of executive 
compensation
“company size is the most important variable in explaining the level 
of executive compensation (relation between company size and 
compensation is nonlinear); using alternative monitory mechanisms 
(institutional investors, debt holders, and outside directors) leads to 
higher levels of long-term incentives; executive shareholdings are much 
more powerful incentive than executive compensation”
Jensen and Murphy, 
1990
CEO’s incentives - it’s 
not how much you pay, 
but how
“incentives provide safeguards against “looting” by managers in 
collusion with “captive” directors; compensation committees typically 
react to the agitation over pay levels by capping - explicitly or implicitly 
- the amount of money the CEO earns”
Artz, 2008 Performance pay and 
job satisfaction
“performance pay increases job satisfaction (largely among union 
workers and males) only in larger firms - only in big firms the 
performance pay is able to decrease the distance between workers and 
decision makers”
THE RELEVANCE AND EFFECTS OF THE EXECUTIVE-TO-WORKER PAY RATIO’ DISCLOSURE178
Sabina Lacmanović
Ozkan, 2011 CEO compensation 
and firm performance
“larger firms pay their CEOs larger compensation; firms 
with larger board size pay their CEOs higher levels of total 
compensation; firms with a higher proportion of non-executive 
directors on board pay their CEOs more; non-executive 
directors do not seem to provide monitoring in determining 
CEO compensation; non-executive directors’ share ownership 
has a negative and significant impact on CEO compensation 
level - ownership can provide incentives for non-executive 
directors to be more active in monitoring CEO compensation 
packages; institutional and block-holder ownership have a 
significant and negative impact on the level of total CEO and 
cash compensation - shows the existence of active monitoring 
by block-holders and institutional shareholders; institutional 
share ownership has a positive and significant impact on CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity of option grants; longer CEO 
tenure is associated with lower pay-for-performance sensitivity 
of option grants “
He, 2008 Do founders matter? “founder CEOs tend to earn smaller incentive compensation 
and smaller total compensation than professional CEOs; 
founder-managed firms are associated with higher financial 
performance and are more likely to survive than professional 
managed firms; firms with founder-CEOs are associated with 
even higher financial performance when the position of CEO 
and chairperson of the board is combined “
Cronqvist et al., 
2009
Do entrenched 
managers pay their 
workers more?
“CEOs with more control pay their workers more; entrenched 
CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate 
hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters and 
associated with conflict-inclined unions; financial incentives 
through cash flow rights ownership by a CEO are negatively 
related to employee compensation”
Lin et al., 2013 Fat cat CEOs’ 
compensation - the 
determinants
“there is a substitution effect between CEO compensation 
and the level of CEO ownership; tenure and firm size are 
significantly positively associated with CEO compensation; firm 
size appears to be the most important determinant of CEO 
compensation; there is a general lack of linkage between pay 
and performance “
Miles and Miles, 
2013





“companies identified as good corporate social performers 
have lower levels of executive compensation; positive 
relationship between social and financial performance”






“it depends on justice perception; a precipitating event, such 
as a large pay increase or bonus for a CEO when employees 
are facing layoffs or pay and benefit cuts, may call attention 
to the gap and create injustice perceptions – this may lead 
to counterproductive workplace behaviors that may be 
detrimental to organizational effectiveness”
continued table
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Faleye et al., 2013 The determinants 
and effects of CEO-
employee pay ratios
“CEO–employee pay ratios depend on the balance 
of power between the CEO (relative to the board) 
and ordinary employees (relative to management); 
ordinary employees appear to perceive an opportunity in 
higher pay ratios but the extent to which such perception 
incentivizes them depends on the likelihood of success in a 
series of sequential promotion tournaments; 
the ratio of executive compensation to ordinary employee pay 
has no significant effect on 
employee productivity on average; 
productivity increases with relative pay when the firm has 
fewer employees who are well-informed on executive pay 
or are not unionized, and when promotion decisions are 
predominantly merit-based”
Ferri and Maber, 
2013
Say on Pay votes and 
CEO compensation
“UK firms responded to negative say on pay voting outcomes 
by removing controversial CEO pay practices criticized 
as rewards for failure (e.g., generous severance contracts) 
and increasing the sensitivity of pay to poor realizations of 
performance”
Balsam and Yin, 
2012
The impact of Say-
on-Pay on executive 
compensation
“affected firms reduced compensation and made it more 
performance-based, with that decrease being greater for firms 
that previously overpaid their CEOs; the percentage of votes 
cast against executive pay is lower when the firm reduced 
executive compensation in advance of the initial say-on-pay 
vote, but higher when the firm pays higher total compensation, 
has a large increase in compensation, has a larger amount of 
compensation that cannot be explained by economic factors, 
or has a higher amount of other compensation (e.g. private jets, 
country club memberships, tax gross ups)
Iacobucci, 1998 The effects of 
disclosure on executive 
compensation
Positive effects:
“sensitivity of pay to performance (desirable transition to 
variable pay with a similar risk-adjusted decrease in fixed pay); 
increase shareholder control over the way executives are paid; 
lowers the shareholders’ cost of monitoring the setting of 
executive compensation; publicizes the results of shareholder 
activism; encouraging shareholder supervision; a social benefit 
- provision of additional information to the managerial labor 
market”
Negative effects:
“may have an inflationary effect on compensation level 
(additional variable pay package/pay-for-performance without 
a similar decrease in fixed pay); by potentially conveying 
information about the executives’ ability disclosure may have 
a direct impact on pay levels (executives wishing to indicate 
superior ability will seek higher compensation)”
continued table




The role of disclosure Positive effects:
“enhance the accountability and visibility of the remuneration 
committee; sharpens shareholder monitoring - induces 
institutional shareholders to play a more activist role; lowers 
the cost of monitoring; facilitates communication between 
institutional investors and with management; enables the 
adoption of effective incentive contracts - it can manage 
the agency costs of executive pay, across dispersed and 
blockholding systems, without intervening in governance 
choices and structures”
Negative effects:
“costs of disclosure: popular and political reaction/pressures 
(media, labor unions, political activist) - remuneration 
committee may adopt suboptimal remuneration structures 
which are not sufficiently sensitive to performance; disclosure 
may result in an increase in pay due to a ratcheting effect”
Source: Research results
The results have shown positive impact of the pay ratio’ disclosure on the employee 
motivation, moral40, behavior41 and productivity, as well as on the company performance42. Such 
empirical results are especially important if we are considering the necessity to foster a relational 
psychological contract with employees in order to encourage them (including directors) to 
perform trust-generating and trust-based behaviors.43 
The arguments about the costs of disclosure are not holding. Companies are already 
required to collect and maintain their employees’ compensation data for accounting and tax 
purposes. And the costs of disclosure are very often greatly surpassed by hidden costs of high pay 
ratio (officially disclosed or not). The disclosure could actually help corporate decision makers to 
get more informed before deciding about compensation plans and levels.
The disclosure also helps investors. Disclosure of the median annual total compensation 
for all employees will help investors compare compensation structures between peer companies. 
High median employee compensation may indicate that a company pays high wages to attract 
the most qualified employees and to ensure high productivity. High employee compensation may 
also indicate a highly skilled workforce. The ratio of CEO to worker pay shows wage dispersion 
within a company, such as flat versus pyramid compensation structures. Pyramid compensation 
structures can have a negative effect on employee morale and productivity.44 And lower pay ratio 
could indicate lower turnover rates.
continued table
40 Miller, S.: Executive Pay: How Much Is Too Much?, Growing Pay Disparity Between Top Executives and Average Workers 
Threatens Morale, February 2012, available at:, http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/compensation/articles/pages/
executive-pay-how-much.aspx (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
41 Neely, C. R., Boyd, N. G.: The Influence of Executive Compensation on Employee Behaviors Through Precipitation Events, 
Journal of Managerial Issues, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2010.
42 Brick, I. E., Palmon, O., Wald, J. K.: CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence or 
Cronysm?, Journal of Corporate Finance, 12, 2006, p. 403-423.
43 Kidder, D. L., Buchholtz, A. K.: Can Excess Bring Success? CEO Compensation and the Psychological Contract, Human 
Resource Management Review, 12, 2002, p. 599 – 617.
44 Available at: http://www.workerscapital.org/images/uploads/AFL-CIO%20Pay-ratio%20disclosure%20-%20
Information%20for%20Investors.pdf (accessed 29 Aug 2013).
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The research was limited by the availability of data. The empirical study of the introduction of say-
on-pay provisions regarding pay ratio’ disclosure in the Republic of Croatia will give new evidence 
and arguments on the paper’s topic. And the comparative data for the chosen 5 countries will give 
an empirical support to the arguments presented in the paper.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The central question in the debate over disclosure policies is whether the compensation of the 
directors/executives is in line with their contribution to the company success. The compensation 
policies in practice are often used to reinforce the elitist position of CEOs instead of rewarding all 
who contributed to the creation of value/wealth (the company success is always the result of a 
team work, i.e., of capital, infrastructure and labor’ investors). Some critics of the disclosure defend 
high executive-to-worker pay ratios with the following argument: managers of today are working 
in a very complex, unstable and global environment which asks for greater skills and responsibility 
level. However, the studies presented in this paper indicate that the high pay dispersion may result 
in overall lower levels of individual and organizational performance. The reason to this is that after 
a certain point larger pay differences can create feelings of injustice that can diminish cooperation, 
quality and commitment to long-term success.
As empirical research results are showing the disclosure of executive-to-worker pay ratio is 
not only beneficial to the company financial results, but also to the investors who are seeking for 
long-term oriented companies. Fundamentally, higher wages suggest that a company is making 
strategic investments in human capital and the investors could biased on that and more equitable 
pay structure assume decreased turnover.
This paper has given a broader perspective on the pay ratio disclosure effects. The list of 
pay ratio-relevant variables identified through literature review could be used as a valuable source 
for future quantitative research, i.e. for creating a valid instrument that measures the effects of pay 
ratio disclosure on firm’s and individuals’ performance, and on investors’ decisions. The findings 
of the conducted research have shown that the pay ratio disclosure improves the firm’s and 
individuals’ performance which lead us to conclusion that the pay ratio disclosure requirement 
should be introduced as an obligatory part of the yearly remuneration report. In countries where 
such disclosure requirement is not yet introduced, we strongly recommend that companies start 
to disclose their pay ratio voluntarily. The research was limited by the availability of data (only 
secondary data were used) but gives a thorough theoretical base for future primary quantitative 
research.
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